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Abstract:  
Member States have sought to implement European Union (EU) initiatives on the promotion 
of renewable energy for almost 20 years now. However, some Member States are now finding 
that some of these very policy initiatives on renewable energy promotion have the capacity to 
conflict with these same Member States’ other EU and international obligations,  such as in 
the areas of international trade, foreign investment protection, and the functioning of the 
internal energy market. This article will provide an historical progression of EU laws and 
policies concerning the promotion of renewable energy generation, identify many of the 
factors inhibiting or challenging the achievement of EU renewable energy policy goals, and 
consider whether the proposed shifts in renewable energy promotion policy are likely to be 
effective in addressing these challenges.  
1.  Introduction 
Member States of the European Union (EU) have sought to promote renewable energy 
generation as a means for meeting international and regional (EU) obligations to mitigate 
climate change; and it is now some of these very policy initiatives that are coming under 
attack when they might conflict with a Member State’s other international and EU 
obligations, such as in the areas of international trade, foreign investment protection, and the 
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functioning of the internal energy market. Member States of the EU are under cross-fire in 
regard to how they promote and incentivize renewable energy. Member States are 
increasingly challenged by other Member States, EU institutions – especially the European 
Commission (Commission), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals.  
In implementing national policies on the promotion of renewable energy generation, all 
Member States have the goal of achieving national binding targets mandated under the 2009 
Renewable Energy Directive (2009 Directive).4 While these targets are binding, the means by 
which a Member State achieves the targets are flexible, uncoordinated, and relatively isolated 
from an EU-wide policy. Given some of the problems in implementing a renewable energy 
promotion policy at the EU level, the Commission is currently working to correct what it sees 
as problems that have risen in regard to the autonomous development of renewable energy 
policies at the Member State level. Of primary importance is the design of support schemes. 
These have demonstrated important successes, but have also evidenced a number of policy 
failures.  
As will be further explored, Member State support schemes for the incentivization of 
renewable energy have led to market distortions, state aid investigations, and exposure to 
potential responsibility under international investment agreements (IIAs). These issues have 
highlighted a need for greater policy coordination between the EU and its Member States. For 
the Commission, a ‘Europeanization’ of support schemes is needed to achieve the policy 
goals that are about to be set at the EU level on the promotion of renewable energy.  
To address many of these issues, the Commission has been active in: (1) modifying the 
approach to the promotion of renewable energy generation; (2) modifying the approach to 
state aid; (3) criticizing some Member State policies on over-incentivization (and subsequent 
revocation of support); (4) challenging Member State refusal to subsidize non-national 
producers; and (5) attacking the validity of intra-EU IIAs and the enforcement of arbitral 
awards based on intra-EU IIAs. But EU institutions are also concerned about the principle of 
subsidiarity and the need to allow Member States flexibility in designing national policies to 
promote renewable energy. In looking at these issues, this article will examine the historical 
progression of EU laws and policies concerning the promotion of renewable energy 
generation, identify many of the factors inhibiting or challenging the achievement of EU 
renewable energy policy goals (highlighted above), and consider whether the proposed shifts 
in renewable energy promotion policy are likely to be effective in addressing these challenges 
while allowing sufficient policy space to Member States. 
2. Shifting Trends in EU Policies on the Promotion of Renewable Energy 
Promoting the production of renewable energy has been a high priority for the EU since the 
1990s.5 In its 1997 White Paper, the Commission set a community strategy and action plan 
for renewable energy emphasizing the importance of promoting and further developing the 
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renewable energy sector in the EU.6 Flowing from this White Paper, the first Directive on the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources (2001 Directive) was 
adopted.7 This Directive set a target of a twelve percent share of renewable energy in the 
overall energy consumption of the EU by 2010.8 To achieve this target, Member States were 
given non-binding national targets.9 In addition, the 2001 Directive introduced support 
schemes and guarantees of origin aiming at supporting the achievement of the target. 
Considering the limited experience with support schemes at that time, the 2001 Directive did 
not include a harmonized support mechanism but simply required the Commission to monitor 
the developments and report on the experience gained with the implementation of support 
schemes.10   
In 2007, the Commission presented its Renewable Energy Roadmap highlighting the failure to 
achieve the agreed target in renewable energy due to ‘a policy failure and a result of the 
inability or the unwillingness to back political declarations by political and economic 
incentives’.11 As a way forward, the Commission proposed the adoption of a binding target 
and increasing the overall level of renewable energy from final energy consumption to twenty 
percent by 2020. Following the Commission proposal, a new Directive on renewable energy 
was adopted in 2009.12 This Directive introduced a common framework with national binding 
targets calculated on the basis of the 2005 share of renewable energy in each Member State.13 
According to the 2009 Directive, Member States were allocated binding targets set at the EU 
level and aimed at meeting the EU-wide goal of achieving twenty percent of its total energy 
consumption from renewable sources by 2020. In setting these binding targets, the EU was 
purposefully silent (for the most part) on mandating the ways and means that these renewable 
targets would be met by each Member State. This policy is consistent with the EU’s 
subsidiarity principle and gives Member States a great degree of flexibility in designing their 
renewable energy promotion policies.14 The binding nature of the renewable energy targets 
stipulated in the 2009 Directive has also led to a considerable increase in investment in green 
electricity in the EU.15 
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Due in 2010, the 2009 Directive required each Member State to submit a National Renewable 
Energy Action Plan to the Commission showing how they intended to achieve their binding 
national targets.16 These plans allow Member States the flexibility to decide how they will 
achieve their targets and foster the necessary stability for investors. A reporting system 
ensuring the monitoring of the progress was also established.17 The 2009 Directive 
encourages cooperation through cross-border projects, support schemes, and statistical 
transfer of energy from renewable sources between Member States.18 The 2009 Directive 
reformed the system of guarantees of origin introduced by the 2001 Directive. The guarantees 
of origins were standardized and considered as a tradable good.19  
Much has been achieved with regards to the targets set for development of the renewable 
energy sector since the adoption of the 2009 Directive;20 but the EU has now started to look 
beyond 2020. In early 2014, the Commission published its 2030 Climate and Energy Policy 
Framework (2030 Policy Framework), which sets out new energy and climate objectives in 
the period from 2020 to 2030.21 The 2030 Policy Framework sets an EU target of at least 
twenty-seven percent of total energy consumption from renewable sources by 2030. This will 
be a binding target at the EU level which will not be translated into binding targets at the 
national level. This move away from binding national targets has been criticized by certain 
members of the European Parliament as ‘short-sighted’ and ‘unambitious’.22 According to the 
Commission and the European Council (Council), however, an EU-wide binding target will 
continue to allow Member States the flexibility to design their renewable energy policies in a 
manner specific to their circumstances, while at the same time strengthening regional 
cooperation between Member States and assist the EU in moving closer to a single energy 
market.23 With this common approach, the EU aims at ensuring stronger investment stability, 
greater transparency, coherence and coordination across the EU.24 This position was also 
endorsed by Advocate General (AG) Bot in Green Network: a CJEU case concerning the 
obligation to purchase green certificates on energy produced outside the EU. AG Bot stated 
                                                          
16 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2009/28/EC, Art. 4. 
17 Ibid., Art. 22. 
18 Ibid., Arts. 6-11. 
19 Ibid., Art. 15. 
20 European Commission, Renewable Energy Progress Report, COM(2015) 293 Final, (15 June 2015). 
21 The 2030 Policy Framework was endorsed by the European Council on 24 October 2014; see European 
Council, Conclusions, EUCO 169/14, (24 October 2014), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ 
docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). In July 2015, the Commission started the 
legislative process necessary to implement post-2020 commitments into EU law: see European Parliament, Post-
2020 Reform of the EU Emissions Trading System, Briefing: EU Legislation in Progress, (18 September 2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568334/EPRS_BRI%282015%29568334_EN.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2017). 
22 See EurActiv, Parliament Backs Strong EU Stance on 2030 Clean Energy Goals, (6 February 2014), 
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/meps-confirm-ambitious-stance-20-news-533298 (accessed 15 January 2017). 
23 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Policy Framework for Climate 
and Energy in the Period from 2020 to 2030, COM(2014) 15, 3, (22 January 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015&from=EN (accessed 15 January 2017). 
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that the EU’s new policy towards renewable energy will allow for ‘a new more collective, 
coherent and coordinated approach to the promotion of green energy’.25 
By adopting an EU-level binding target, the Commission aims at stimulating the development 
of renewable energy at the EU level while still giving Member States sufficient flexibility in 
the design and implementation of their renewable energy policies. However, a primary driver 
in the EU’s recent shift in renewable energy policy appears aimed at facilitating the 
‘Europeanization’ of support schemes and in decreasing barriers preventing the completion of 
the internal energy market. The Commission has also emphasized that new renewable energy 
promotion plans of Member States must take into account ‘the need to comply with 
competition and State aid rules to avoid market distortions and ensure cost-effectiveness’.26  
Hence, while the new approach provides Member States flexibility in fixing their targets, it 
may at the same time reduce their flexibility to decide how they support the development of 
renewable energy within their borders.27 According to the Commission, technology neutrality 
and equal treatment of all renewables without sector specific targets or support schemes 
across the EU could improve short to medium term cost-effectiveness.28 The Commission has 
emphasized that the 2030 Policy Framework is focused, inter alia, on strengthening regional 
cooperation, the further integration of the internal energy market, and undistorted 
competition.29 To ensure the monitoring of an EU-wide target, the Commission has proposed 
a transparent governance system that will assess national plans with the aim of enhancing 
predictability for investors and fostering regional cooperation between Member States.30 
While the drive to liberalize and integrate renewable energy markets in the EU has been 
historically left to the Member States to implement, the 2030 Policy Framework signals a 
significant shift towards a more centralized coordination of policies by the Commission.31  
In line with many of the policy goals outlined in the 2030 Policy Framework, the Commission 
released its new draft renewable energy directive (new Directive) on 30 November 2016,32 
which confirmed the intent of the EU to pursue EU-wide targets and to limit the use of 
support schemes. However, it remains unclear exactly how the new Directive will guarantee 
compliance with the new EU-wide binding renewable energy target; and how support 
schemes can be designed so as to ensure their compliance with EU state aid rules. These 
issues remain of critical importance given the problems that Member States have encountered 
with the implementation of their support for renewable energy under the current Directive. 
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28 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, 
SWD(2014) 16 final, 2, 13-14 (22 January 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/ 
docs/ia_2014/swd_2014_0016_en.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). 
29 European Commission, A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy, supra n 23, 3. 
30 Ibid., 12-13; European Council, Conclusions, supra n 21, 9. 
31 Kim Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account, 286 (Oxford University Press 2013). 
32 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), COM(2016) 767 final (30 November 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_en_act_part1_v7_1.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). 
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For many Member States, the primary mode of support has come through feed-in tariff 
(FITs), feed-in premium (FIPs) or green certificate programs; and some of the components of 
these programs have become subject to state aid investigations in recent years. While these 
support schemes have worked in many Member States (e.g. Germany), they have, as we shall 
see, given rise to a number of problematic situations in many others (e.g. Spain, the Czech 
Republic, and Italy).  
While the 2009 Directive provided Member States considerable latitude in the design and 
management of their support schemes, the new Directive, provides the EU with considerable 
oversight and monitoring authority over the ways in which Member States achieve renewable 
energy targets. However, what is missing in the new Directive is a common policy approach 
on the use of support schemes that would limit or prevent many of the missteps made by 
Member States under the current Directive. In the next section, we explore some of the 
problems with support schemes that have emerged under the 2009 Directive and to explain 
what role the Commission could play in mitigating some of these issues through the new 
Directive. 
 
3. The Need for Change – Case Studies on Feed-In Tariffs 
One of the primarily catalysts for the recent proposed shifts in the renewable energy policies 
of the EU has been the practice of support schemes for the promotion of renewable energy in 
a key number of Member States. These Member States over-incentivized their renewable 
energy support schemes initially and have had to withdraw or revoke much of the support for 
renewable energy investment that was originally on offer. While a large number of Member 
States have had to modify their support schemes in recent years, three particular Member 
States stand out for having to make drastic reforms to their renewable energy support 
schemes; and which have now led to a significant number of international disputes.  
These Member States – Spain, the Czech Republic and Italy – all over-incentivized their 
renewable sector in the mid- to late 2000s, and have had to make drastic adjustments in the 
past few years. These modifications to their support schemes have resulted in investment 
treaty arbitrations being filed against them. In the following section, we have chosen to 
provide case studies on these three Member States because they are the only EU Member 
States to date that have become subject to investment treaty arbitrations as a direct result of 
the (mis)management of their renewable energy support policies. However, with that said, the 
modification of support schemes for renewable energy has occurred in a large number of 
Member States; and may lead to the initiation of investment treaty arbitrations in the future. 
For example, Romania, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Greece, Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, and France have all made significant modifications to their support schemes 
in recent years.33  
                                                          
33 For more details, see Keep on Track 2020, Retroactive and Retrospective Changes and Moratoria to RES 
Support, (March 2015), http://www.keepontrack.eu/contents/publicationsbiannualnationalpolicyupdates 
versions/policy-briefing6-retroactive-and-retrospective-changes-and-moratoria-to-res-support.pdf (accessed 15 
January 2017); CEER, Status Review of Renewable and Energy Efficiency Support Schemes in Europe in 2012 
and 2013, (2015). EPIA, Retrospective Measures at the National Level and Their Impact on the Photovoltaic 
Sector, (10 December 2013), http://www.photon.info/ newsletter/document/83019.pdf (accessed 15 January 
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As noted above, the 2009 Directive focuses on the consumption of energy within each 
Member State and at the European level. The most important means to achieve the targets on 
renewable energy have been the establishment of support schemes, such as FITs, FIPs, and 
green certificates. These measures are focused on different elements in the process of 
production, distribution and consumption of energy. As a very general starting point, support 
schemes that are targeted at producers or the transactions between producers and distributors 
(generally referred to as transmission system operators (TSOs) or distribution system 
operators (DSOs))34 are likely to raise crucial issues regarding distortive market effects and 
‘leakage’ (i.e. support schemes being enjoyed by foreign producers or consumers). Support 
schemes that are targeted at consumers or the transactions between TSOs/DSOs and 
consumers, on the other hand, are less likely to have such effects. Our preliminary study 
indicates that FITs and FIPs are focused on the transactions between electricity producers and 
TSOs/DSOs, while green certificates35 can tend to focus on the relationship between 
TSOs/DSOs and consumers. For this reason and due to the extensive resort to FITs, we have 
chosen to focus on FITs in our case studies. 
In the European context, Germany’s FIT program dates back to the 1990s, and was followed 
by a number of other FIT and FIP programs in the early 2000s. A FIT program aims at 
offsetting the higher cost of renewables technologies in relation to fossil fuels, and provides a 
stable all-inclusive price for electricity generated from renewable sources.36 A FIP (also 
called a green bonus) on the other hand is paid in addition to the market price. A FIP is 
considered to be more market-friendly than the FIT because the producer is exposed to market 
price risk. While each of these programs is specific to the EU Member State, they have a 
number of similar design features: (1) they provide an additional price (i.e. above the market 
price for electricity) paid for electricity produced from renewable energy sources; (2) the 
additional price is only paid on electricity actually ‘fed-in’ to the grid (i.e. submitted to the 
TSO/DSO); (3) tariffs are often differentiated according to characteristics of the production 
facility (i.e. its size, geographical location and energy source); (4) the tariff is guaranteed for a 
certain period of time, normally fifteen to twenty-five years; (5) the tariff price is set to 
digress over time; and (6) FIT and FIP schemes have increasingly been using local content 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2017). Bulgaria, e.g., applied a ‘temporary’ thirty-nine percent grid access tax on all PV solar producers 
benefiting from the state’s FIT scheme. See PV Magazine, Bulgarian PV Industry Protests Limits on Renewable 
Energy Production, (4 July 2013), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/bulgarian-pv-industry-
protests-limits-on-renewable-energy-production-updated_100011921/#axzz3lf2lii19 (accessed 15 January 2017).  
34 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2009/28/EC, Art. 2(4), Art. 2(6): ‘transmission system 
operator’ means a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if 
necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where applicable, its interconnections with 
other systems, and for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the 
transmission of electricity; ‘distribution system operator’ means a natural or legal person responsible for 
operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the distribution system in a given area and, 
where applicable, its interconnections with other systems and for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to 
meet reasonable demands for the distribution of electricity. 
35 There exists a wide variety of schemes that can be labelled ‘green certificates’. While some target producers 
requiring them to submit an amount of green certificates depending on their overall level of production, other 
schemes target TSOs/DSOs and require them to submit an amount of green certificates based on the amount of 
energy they transfer to consumers. 
36 It can also be discussed whether FITs may distinguish between different kinds of renewable energy, i.e. 
between well-established sources such as hydro-power and emerging sources such as wave or tidal energy. 
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requirements for the production equipment, providing a bonus payment to those facilities that 
source a certain percentage of their equipment from within the EU.37  
While there are a number of similarities among different FIT and FIP programs in the EU, 
there is one key difference that appears to be a key determinant in whether a particular 
program has been considered a success or not: the extent to which the programs over-
incentivized certain types of renewable technologies (in other words: under-estimated the 
amount of new investment that the support scheme would produce). This is a phenomenon 
that has been present for producers of electricity using solar energy (especially in the 
photovoltaic (PV) solar sector and to a less extent, the concentrated solar power (CSP) 
sector).38 Our case studies therefore focus on the solar sector in three select states which have 
all made major revisions to their renewable support schemes in the last five years and have 
spawned significant international litigation: Spain, the Czech Republic, and Italy. 
Spain 
Already in the 1980 the Spanish government encouraged the use of renewable energies.39  
Spain introduced more specific measures to promote renewable energy in 2004.40 These 
measures offered investors either a fixed price FIT or a FIP. The FIT amounted to 
approximately thirty-two Eurocents per kilowatt/hour (kWh) for electricity produced from PV 
solar,41 and it was guaranteed for a period of twenty-five years after which it would be 
reduced by approximately twenty percent (for years twenty-six through forty). Under the 
legislation, the DSO was required to bear the cost of the FIT. These additional costs exceeded 
the regulated price that could be charged to consumers, resulting in a multi-billion Euro debt 
held by the state (called an ‘electricity deficit’).42 In 2005, Spain enacted a renewable energy 
plan in accordance with the 2001 Directive. According to this plan, Spain set a target of 
achieving twelve percent of its total energy consumed from renewable sources by 2010. 
Spain’s share of electricity consumed from renewable sources was 8.3 percent in 2005 and 
reached 13.8 percent by 2010.  
                                                          
37 Member states with local content requirements as a component part of their support schemes include France, 
Italy, Greece, and Croatia. These local content requirements generally provide a bonus payment (on top of the 
FIT or FIP rate) for equipment sourced within the EU. 
38 As PV solar and CSP installations are regulated and supported under the same schemes, we use the term ‘PV 
solar’ to refer to both types of installations. 
39 For further details, see Iñigo del Guayo, Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources by Regions: The Case of the 
Spanish Autonomous Communities, in Marjan Peeters & Thomas Schomerus (eds.), Renewable Energy Law in 
the EU: Legal Perspectives on Bottom-up Approaches, 54 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2014). 
40 Royal decree 436/2004 establishing the methodology for the updating and systematisation of the legal and 
economic regime for electric power production in the special regime, 8 Legislation Development of the Spanish 
Electric Power Act, Published in the Official State Journal, B.O.E., Issue 75 (27 March 2004), http://www.area-
net.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PACT/Laws/Spain_436_2004_english.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). 
41 The FIP for PV solar amounted to about ten percent less than the FIT. 
42 Under the original plan, the amount of PV solar installed would be small enough that the additional costs could 
largely be absorbed by the DSO. However, the surge in the installation made it impossible to absorb the 
additional costs and it was at this point that the electricity deficit expanded significantly. The deficit is in excess 
of thirty billion Euro (and continues to grow). See also David Robinson, Pulling the Plug on Renewable Power 
in Spain, Oxford Energy Comment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (2013), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/ 
wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Pulling-the-Plug-on-Renewable-Power-in-Spain.pdf (accessed 15 January 
2017). 
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In May of 2007, Spain updated its program by increasing the tariff to approximately forty-six 
Eurocents/kWh for PV solar.43 This amendment created a cap on the amount of PV solar44 
that could be installed. Once the cap was reached, regulators could adjust the FIT. While 
Spain had set a goal of installing 400 megawatts (MW) of PV solar by 2010, this was reached 
in early 2007; and by 2010, nearly 4000 MW had been installed.45  
Figure 1: Annual Installed PV Solar in Spain in MWh 
 
By late 2007, Spanish regulators knew that the deployment of PV solar installations was 
occurring so rapidly as to reach its targets three years ahead of schedule. When the Spanish 
legislature responded in September 2008, there had already been a dramatic surge in the 
amount of PV solar installed. The legislation modified the method for allocating FIT contracts 
and reduced the FIT in 2008.46 As follows from Figure 1 above, these changes provided 
significant disincentive for future PV solar installations.47 Spain continued to modify the 
support scheme during 2010: (1) the FIT was reduced by forty-five percent and the FIT after 
twenty-five years was withdrawn;48 (2) FIT contracts (including existing ones) were modified 
by limiting the number of hours that PV solar installations could operate and a grid access fee 
of approximately two Eurocents/kWh on electricity from PV solar installations was 
introduced.49 These changes reduced expected revenue from PV solar projects by about thirty 
percent.50  
In 2011, Spain submitted another renewable energy plan as mandated by the 2009 Directive 
by which it agreed to achieving twenty percent of its total energy consumption from 
                                                          
43 National Energy Regulatory Commission, Legislation Development of the Spanish Electric Power Act, Royal 
decree 661/2007 regulating the activity of electricity production under the special regime, BOE 126, 73 (26 May 
2007), http://bit.ly/1O9w2UR (accessed 15 January 2017). 
44 While the FIT program focused on energy generated from PV solar, it also included CSP and provided the 
same incentivization for both CSP and PV solar. 
45 Francisco Montoya, María Aguilera & Francisco Manzano-Agugliaro, Renewable energy production in Spain: 
A Review 33 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review 513-515 (2014). 
46 Royal decree 1578/2008 (26 September 2008). 
47 The changes reduced the net amount of installed PV solar in 2009 to almost nothing, before the installation 
picked up again in 2010. 
48 Royal decree law 1565/2010 (23 November 2010). 
49 Royal decree law 14/2010 (23 December 2010). While the increasing electricity deficit has been exasperated 
by the generous FIT program for PV solar, the electricity deficit in Spain has been a general problem for a long 
time and is tied to all sources of electricity.  
50 Pablo del Rio & Pere Mir-Artiques, A Cautionary Tale: Spain’s Solar PV Investment Bubble, Global Subsidies 
Initiative 22 (2014), https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/rens_ct_spain.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). 
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renewable sources by 2020.51 While PV solar continues to be a part of the renewable energy 
mix that will assist in Spain’s achievement of its renewable energy targets, it remains only a 
small percentage of Spain’s overall electricity consumption (3.2 percent in 2012). 
To address the ‘electricity deficit’, legislation was passed in 2012 that placed a moratorium on 
the registration of new PV solar projects for an indefinite period, and that imposed an open-
ended seven percent tax on all electricity generators from 2013.52 In early 2013, the changes 
continued with legislation that terminated the FIT support scheme for all new renewable 
energy installations from 2014.53  
New legislation passed in 2013 and 2014 requires that FIT rates on future projects be based 
on an internal rate of return between five and 5.5 percent after taxes.54 This change means that 
any projects that were financed at a rate higher than five percent are likely to be unprofitable. 
The government originally envisioned support to PV solar projects to provide an internal rate 
of return of approximately seven percent, which would permit a ‘reasonable rentability’ on 
projects.55 The internal rate of return on many projects prior to the series of legislative 
changes between 2008 and 2012 was between ten and fifteen percent.56  
The PV solar sector in Spain has obviously experienced what can be considered a boom 
followed by a bust; and this bust has resulted in a number of lawsuits. At the national level, 
there have been at least fifty cases decided before the Spanish Supreme Court, all of which 
have been rejected.57 However, this is only the tip of the iceberg in that as many as 630 000 
appeals could be brought in the Spanish courts as a result of the modifications made to 
legislation.58 At the European level, numerous complaints have been brought to the 
Commission by those who have invested in the PV sector in Spain, including one complaint 
brought by a group of 1 500 investors requesting an investigation into the changes made by 
Spain and their consistency with EU law.59 
Czech Republic 
The FIT program established in the Czech Republic in 2002 only resulted in a few renewable 
energy projects as the FIT rates were too low.60 In 2005, the Renewable Energy Support Act 
                                                          
51Ministry of Industry and Tourism, Spain’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan 2011-2020, 43 (30 June 
2010), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/action_plan_en.htm (accessed 15 January 2017). 
52 Royal decree law 1/2012 (27 January 2012). 
53 Royal decree law 2/2013 (1 February 2013). 
54 Royal decree law 9/2013 (12 July 2013); Royal decree 413/2014 (6 June 2014). 
55 For a definition of ‘reasonable rentability’ as defined in Art. 19 of Royal decree 413/2014, Electricity 
Promotion in Spain, SRES Legal (7 July 2014). 
56 del Rio and Mir-Artiques,  A Cautionary Tale, supra n 50, 12. 
57 See http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/index.jsp, search terms: ley 14/2010, ley 1565/2010 (accessed 15 
January 2017). See also Blanca Lopez, Spain’s Supreme Tribunal Rules Against PV System Owners, PV 
magazine, (25 January 2016), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/spains-supreme-tribunal-rules-
against-pv-system-owners_100022919/#axzz4HlSA0gM6 (accessed 15 January 2017). 
58 Renewable Energy Magazine, Spanish Congress Approves Royal Decree Described as ‘The Photovoltaic 
Sector’s Ruin’, (28 February 2011), http://www.renewableenergymagazine.com/article/spanish-congress-
approves-royal-decree-described-as (accessed 15 January 2017). 
59 John Parnell, Fight against Spain’s Solar Cuts Taken to Brussels, PV Tech, (23 June 2014), http://www.pv-
tech.org/news/spanish_solar_cuts_case_taken_to_european_commission (accessed 15 January 2017). 
60 Ministry of Industry and Trade notice 252/2001 coll.  
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(Act)61 introduced a guarantee requiring TSOs/DSOs to purchase all electricity generated 
from renewable sources for a period of fifteen years, and set up a mechanism whereby 
producers can choose between a FIT and a FIP. The Act also authorized a regulator to set FIT 
rates for each year that could not be reduced by more than five percent of the previous years’ 
rates, and were to be differentiated by type of renewable source and by year of 
commissioning. This legislation significantly increased the tariff available for PV solar 
installations, reduced the discretion of the energy regulator in adjusting prices, and offered 
long-term contracts guaranteeing the payment of all electricity produced from PV solar.  
Figure 2: Annual Installed PV Solar in the Czech Republic in MWh 
 
There was a drastic increase in PV solar installations after 2008, indicating that the renewable 
support scheme was working.62 The increase created problems related to the potential costs of 
the support scheme over the long-term and a high risk of instability to the electricity grid.63 
This led to a number of reforms and amendments to the Act aimed at reducing the FIT and to 
claw-back some of the extraordinary profits that were being generated by those PV solar 
installations that came online before 2011: (1) the introduction of a moratorium on connecting 
new PV solar installations to the grid in 2011;64 (2) the FIT support for large PV solar 
installations would be terminated from 1 March 2011;65 (3) a tax holiday granted to producers 
of electricity from renewable sources was removed;66 (4) a gift tax was placed on carbon 
credits for 2011 and 2012 and a tax of twenty-eight percent on PV solar installations built in 
2009 and 2010 that receive the FIT (twenty-six percent on the FIP) was to apply from 2011 
through 2013;67 (5) a new regulation permitted the regulator to reduce the annual FIT and FIP 
                                                          
61 Act 180/2005 coll., Act on the promotion of electricity production from renewable energy sources and 
amending certain acts (Act on Promotion of Use of Renewable Sources), (31 March 2005), 
http://www.czrea.org/ files/pdf_en/zakony/RES_act_english.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). 
62 IEA, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: The Czech Republic 2010 Review (2010), at 85, https://www.iea.org/ 
publications/freepublications/publication/CzechRep2010_free.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017). 
63Solar plaza, Photovoltaic in the Czech Republic: Status Update (29 March 2011), http://www.solarplaza.com/ 
channels/archive/11243/photovoltaic-in-the-czech-republic-status-update/ (accessed 15 January 2017); see also 
Luigi Dusonchet & Enrico Telaretti, Economic Analysis of Different Supporting Policies for the Production of 
Electrical Energy by Solar Photovoltaics in Eastern European Union Countries 38 Energy Policy 4013-4014  
(2010). 
64 Act 180/2005 coll. amendment of 1 April 2010. On 16 February 2010, the Czech Republic TSO banned the 
connection of all new PV solar plants to the grid until the end of 2011. 
65 Act 180/2005 coll. amendment, (3 November 2010). 
66 Act 586/1992 coll. amendment, (12 November 2010). 
67 Act 180/2005 coll. amendment, (14 November 2010). 
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for PV solar installations by more than the previously limited five percent;68 and (6) 
legislation was passed to extend the PV solar tax with an open-ended ten percent tax on all 
electricity generated and to terminate all renewable energy support schemes for new 
installations from 2014.69  
The regime governing the PV solar sector remains fragmented with different support schemes 
governing projects brought online at different times. For example, in 2015, the Energy 
Regulatory Office of the Czech Republic (ERO) issued Price Decision Number 5/2015 
(concerning the support to renewable energy sources commissioned from 1 January 2013 to 
31 December 2015) and Price Decision Number 9/2015 (support to renewable energy sources 
put into operation before 2013, holding a valid license and financially supported so far) with 
continuing varied levels of support based on the time the investment was made.70 
Additionally, the Czech Republic recently launched the Operational Programme Enterprise 
and Innovation for Competitiveness 2014-2020 (OPPIK) offering investment grants 
supporting energy efficiency of the business sector and the development of energy from 
renewable sources – but interestingly excludes PV solar energy.71 
Like the Spanish situation, this fragmentation and uncertainty has led to a number of lawsuits. 
At the national level, a case was filed at the Czech Constitutional Court claiming that the PV 
solar tax was discriminatory and violated the Constitution. In a decision rendered on 15 May 
2012, the court upheld the PV solar tax and determined that legal certainty was not an 
absolute right immune from socio-economic changes.72   
Italy 
The 2001 and 2009 Directives prompted the creation of the Italian legal framework for 
support to renewable energy sources.73 The promotion of PV solar began in 2005 following 
the enactment of renewable energy promotion regulations (the first conto energia).  PV solar 
was promoted through green certificates with a monetary value in excess of the market price 
for electricity.74 For PV solar installations, the green certificates amounted to approximately 
                                                          
68 Regulation 2/2010, 18 November 2010. The FIT rates were forty-seven to fifty-five Eurocents/kWh for the 
years 2007 to 2010, and fell to between eight and twenty-one Eurocents/kWh for 2011 to 2013. 
69 Act 165/2012 coll. on supported energy sources and on amendment to some laws (31 January 2012); Act. 
310/2013 coll.; see also CEER, Status Review of Renewable and Energy Efficiency Support Schemes, (2010), 19: 
Czech Electricity and Gas Market Operator (OTE), Year Report on the Electricity and Gas Market in the Czech 
Republic for 2013, at http://www.ote-cr.cz/o-spolecnosti/soubory-vyrocni-zprava-ote/rocni-zprava-2013.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2017); European Commission, Decision SA.35177(2014/N) – Czech Republic – Promotion 
of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources, (11 June 2014). 
70 OTE, Press Release, (4 January 2016), http://www.ote-cr.cz/about-ote/file-news/160105-press-release.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2017); Renewables International, Renewables Face Extinction in Czech Republic (16 
December 2015),  http://www.renewablesinternational.net/renewables-face-extinction-in-czech-republic/150/5 
37/92342/ (accessed 15 January 2017). 
71 OPPIK, Eco-energy – Renewables, http://www.oppik.cz/en/subsidy-programmes/eko-energie (accessed 15 
January 2017); Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, Operational Programme Enterprise and 
Innovation for Competitiveness 2014-2020 (April 2015), Target 3.1, http://www.mpo.cz/dokument169167.html 
(accessed 15 January 2017). 
72 Czech Republic Constitutional Court Judgment, Photovoltaic Power Plants, Pl. US 17/11, (15 May 2012). 
73 Legislative Decree no. 387/03; for further details, see Saverio Massari, The Italian Photovoltaic Sector in Two 
Practical cases: How to Create an Unfavorable Investment Climate in Renewables, OGEL  3 (2015). 
74 Ministerial decree, (28 July 2005). 
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forty-five Eurocent/kWh and were granted to producers75 under twenty year contracts. These 
certificates were consequently comparable to FIPs. In two subsequent conto energias, the 
Italian legislature adjusted various parts of the green certificate scheme.76  
 
Figure 3: Annual Installed PV Solar in Italy in MWh 
 
The fourth conto energia significantly changed the structure of renewable support schemes by 
switching to a fixed price FIT or FIP.77 By the time the fourth conto energia came into force, 
Italy had installed over 10 000 MW of PV solar. The dramatic increase in 2010 and 2011 put 
significant strain on the system. The fourth conto energia aimed at phasing out the green 
certificate program by 2015 and to implement FIT and FIP rates that could be ‘progressively 
reduced over time, in order to balance the level of public support with the costs of 
technologies, giving stability and certainty to the market’.78 By the end of 2011, the support 
offered under the fourth conto energia had declined by thirty-one percent compared to the 
rates offered under the second conto energia.79 In 2012, the fifth conto energia modified the 
support scheme for PV for the fourth time in six years.80 The purpose was essentially to 
terminate the support scheme for utility scale PV solar installations and to put a new cap on 
annual spending.81 
The support scheme for PV solar in Italy comes directly out of the state coffers. This is 
distinct from the approach taken in Spain and the Czech Republic where PV solar support is 
paid by the TSO/DSO and the additional cost (at least partly) is passed onto the customer. The 
fifth conto energia sets a cap for total support at 6.7 billion Euro per year. In 2013, the cap 
was reached in June.82 Given that the majority of twenty year support contracts for green 
                                                          
75 See Gestore Servizi Energetici (GSE), Green Certificates, http://www.gse.it/en/qualificationandcertificates/ 
Pages/default.aspx (accessed 15 January 2017). 
76 Ministerial decree, (19 February 2007); Ministerial decree, (6 August 2010). 
77 Ministerial decree, (5 May 2011). 
78 GSE, Fourth Feed-in-Scheme, http://www.gse.it/en/feedintariff/Photovoltaic/Fourth%20feed-in%20tariff/ 
Pages/default.aspx (accessed 15 January 2017). 
79 del Rio & Mir-Artiques, A Cautionary Tale, supra n 50, 58. 
80 Ministerial decree, (5 July 2012). 
81 GSE, Fifth Feed-in-Scheme, http://www.gse.it/en/feedintariff/Photovoltaic/FifthFeed-inScheme/Pages/ 
default.aspx (accessed 15 January 2017). 
82 Carsten Steinhauer & Riccardo Narducci, Italy: Euro 6.7 Billion Cap for Photovoltaic Incentives Reached, 
Energy Business Law (7 June 2013), http://www.energybusinesslaw.com/2013/06/articles/eu-developments/ 
italy-euro-6-7-billion-cap-for-photovoltaic-incentives-reached  (accessed 15 January 2017).  
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certificates date from about 2010, the available support has already been spent through 
approximately 2030. The result is that very few new PV solar installations will receive any 
support. The fifth conto added a controversial local content bonus of two Eurocents/kWh that 
is available to PV solar producers if a certain percentage of the solar panels are sourced from 
within the EU.83  
In mid-2014, the Italian legislature intervened on an emergency basis.84 This intervention 
reduced all previous support price guarantees for PV solar by seventeen to twenty-five percent 
with effect from 1 January 2015. Finally, on 30 June 2016, a new Ministerial decree providing 
incentives to electricity production from renewable energy sources other than PV solar 
entered into force.85 According to Italy, PV solar energy is already competitive on the market 
and does not require additional support.86 Although PV solar is explicitly excluded, Art. 29 of 
the new decree might provide for the inclusion of PV solar energy, which could possibly 
expose the GSE to legal liability if it decides to reduce or revoke previously granted 
incentives relating to PV solar installations.87 
Concluding Remarks 
These case studies were chosen because of the problems that occurred in implementing 
support schemes for the promotion of renewable energy among EU Member States. There are 
two major sets of conditions that the three case study states failed to anticipate: one is external 
and one is internal. The external conditions are the global financial recession and the 
unanticipated decline in the cost of solar panels. These changes restricted the amount of 
financial support that could be allocated for the promotion of renewable technologies when 
approaching 2010, and the decline in the price of PV solar panels meant that there would be a 
surge of investment in the sector due to the windfall profits that high tariffs and low 
production costs would generate. 
While the external conditions were unanticipated, the internal condition was highly 
predictable and could have largely been avoided. In all three of the case studies, but to 
varying degrees, the regulatory structure established to implement the support schemes for PV 
solar were inflexible and unable to quickly respond to changing market conditions. In all three 
cases, PV solar was over-incentivized initially. By the time that regulators and legislators 
realized that the FITs and FIPs were unsustainable, it was too late and drastic emergency-type 
measures were required to control new investment in the sector. Such measures have reduced 
future subsidies and clawed back some of the ‘wind-fall profit’ of investors, and they have 
resulted in very significant reduction in the establishment of PV solar production capacity. 
                                                          
83 This local content requirement is being challenged by China before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) in: European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector (Complainant: China), DS 452, in consultations (5 November 2012).   
84 Law decree 91/2014, (25 June 2014). 
85 Ministerial decree, (23 June 2016).  
86 This new Italian support scheme  for renewable energy generation was found to be in line with the Community 
Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020 (2014 Guidelines). See European 
Commission, State Aid SA.43756 – Support to Electricity from Renewable Sources Italy (28 April 2016). 
87 Carsten Steinhauer & Riccardo Narducci, Italy: New Incentives for Renewable Energy Plants  (1 July 2016), 
https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2016/07/italy-new-incentives-for-renewable-energy-
plants (accessed 15 January 2017). 
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The latter is remarkable since the falling costs of PV solar should rather have led to an 
increase in installed capacity.  
The measures taken by the Member States have drawn criticism from the Commission. In its 
2013 report on progress under the 2009 Directive, it stated that: 
… rigid national support schemes were generally unable to adapt rapidly 
enough to … falling costs, raising profits and creating a rate and scale of 
installations in some countries almost excessive in a time of general economic 
crisis. The result has been sudden and unpredictable changes to a number of 
national support schemes, which will, again, curtail investment such that there 
remains a risk that the current surplus of PV over planned levels (46TWh 
rather than 35TWh) will disappear and become a deficit by 2020 …  
Given the prominent role that financial support schemes play in developing 
renewable energy today, and given the growing prominence (and cost) of 
renewable energy use in the electricity sector, urgent efforts are needed to 
reform support schemes to ensure that they are designed in a cost effective, 
market-oriented manner. The Commission's guidance is necessary to ensure 
that support schemes are adjusted regularly and quickly enough to take 
account of falling technology costs and to ensure reforms make renewable 
energy producers part of the energy market (such as by moving from feed in 
tariffs to feed in premiums or quotas, and using tendering to avoid over 
compensation etc.); to ensure such market interventions are correcting market 
failures and not adding or maintaining market distortions … 
Many national reforms have had a negative impact on the investment climate. 
Most critical have been changes that reduce the return on investments already 
made. Such changes alter the legitimate expectations of business and clearly 
discourage investment, at a time when significantly more investment is 
needed.88  
4. Scaling Back Incentives and the Investment Treaty Problem 
Investors that are unhappy with the plans to scale back support schemes can resort to dispute 
settlement under IIAs. Rules that discourage support on the one hand, and rules that provide 
remedies if they are withdrawn or modified, on the other, could cause significant tensions 
between a modified EU regime on the promotion of renewable energy and the international 
regime on the protection of foreign investment. While the practice to date indicates that there 
has been little overlap, a recent influx of investment cases may change this perception. 
As was seen in the case studies, the subsidization of renewable energy production through FIT 
programs resulted in rapid and unsustainable growth. To respond to this growth, all three 
states have had to scale back the incentives; and it is this process of modifying and 
withdrawing certain benefits that has led to a significant number of international legal 
                                                          
88 See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Renewable energy progress 
report, COM(2013) 175, 5, 9 (27 March 2013), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:52013DC0175&from=EN (accessed 15 January 2017).  
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disputes. Foreign investors are challenging measures that have the effect of reducing the 
profitability of certain renewable energy projects. Since the attempts to seek recourse in the 
domestic courts of the Czech Republic, Spain and Italy by aggrieved PV solar investors have 
not been fruitful, foreign investors have initiated at least forty-seven international investment 
treaty arbitrations based on the ECT.89 There have been thirty-three cases brought against 
Spain (two have been decided),90 seven cases against the Czech Republic and seven cases 
against Italy.  
Similar to other IIAs, the ECT provides a standing offer to foreign investors to initiate 
arbitration against host states claiming that they have violated the ECT. Investors can bring 
claims in three ways: (1) arbitration through the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), (2) ad hoc arbitration according to the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules, or (3) arbitration hosted by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) (ECT, Art. 
26). Of the forty-seven cases filed to date, thirty-three are ICSID arbitrations, nine are ad hoc 
UNCITRAL arbitrations, and five are SCC arbitrations.  
Considering that most of these cases are still pending and that there is no default rule 
requiring that the registration of the cases or that awards be made publicly available, it is 
unknown exactly how many cases exist and on what legal basis most of the claims are being 
made. In the case of Spain, all thirty-three of the cases have been brought by investors from 
Western Europe.  
The timing of the cases may give an indication as to which measures are being challenged. 
For example, the first of these cases against Spain is an ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration 
brought in November of 2011 by a consolidated group of investors in the Spanish PV solar 
sector.91 It is likely that this claim is based on the changes made to the FIT program in 2010. 
As was seen in section III(A), two laws passed in 2010 reduced the duration under which the 
FIT would be available, put a limit on the number hours that PV solar could benefit from the 
FIT, and added a new grid access fee.92 The claimants will have to show that these changes 
amounted to an indirect expropriation of their investment (Art. 13, ECT) or violated the fair 
and equitable treatment (FET) obligation (Art. 10, ECT).  
The other thirty-two cases against Spain have been filed over a relatively long time period 
ranging from the first cases in 2013 up through the latest in August 2016.93 Four of the cases 
are SCC arbitrations94 and twenty-eight are ICSID arbitrations.95 These cases could be based 
                                                          
89 Two of the cases also refer to a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in addition to the ECT. 
90 While the majority of the cases are in relation to PV solar projects, ten of the cases arise out of CSP projects. 
However, the legislative changes to the FIT program that are being challenged in these cases applied to both PV 
solar and CSP projects. 
91 PV Investors v Spain (UNCITRAL), ECT (1 November 2011). PV Investors is a group of the following 16 
investors: AES (France), Ampere (Netherlands), Element (UK), Eoxis (UK), European Energy (Denmark), 
Foresight (UK), GreenPower (Denmark), GWMLux (Luxembourg), HgCapital (Germany), Hudson (UK), Impax 
(UK), KGAL (Germany), NIBC (Belgium), Scan (Denmark) and White Owl (Germany). 
92 See supra n 47, 48. 
93 Date references in all pending cases provide the known date of case registration. 
94 Charanne (Netherlands) v Spain (SCC), ECT (2013); Isolux (Netherlands) v Spain (SCC), ECT (2013); CSP 
Equity Investment SARL (Luxembourg) v Spain (SCC), ECT (2013); Alten Renewable Energy Developments 
(Netherlands) BV v. Spain (SCC), ECT (2015). 
95 RREEF (UK) v. Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30), ECT (22 November 2013); Antin (France) v Spain 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31), ECT (11 November 2013); Eiser (UK) v Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36), 
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on the legislative changes of 2010, but they may also be tied to the changes occurring in 2013 
and 2014: the mandated reduction in the internal rate of return of PV solar projects to 
approximately five percent and the seven percent tax on all electricity generated.96  
In the last six months, two Spanish cases have reached Awards. The first arbitral Award 
rendered in relation to Spain’s changes to its FIT program for PV solar came in early 2016.97 
The claims in this case were limited to legislative changes through 2010. In an Award dated 
21 January 2016, the Tribunal dismissed the entirety of the claimants’ claims. Although the 
2010 modifications to the FIT program had a significant impact on the profitability of PV 
solar projects, they were not of a severity amounting to a breach of the investment protection 
standards in the ECT. It should be noted that the Award rendered by this Tribunal is not 
binding on any future Tribunals, and therefore may make predictions as to outcome difficult 
to assess, especially in the other Spanish disputes relating to the more severe legislative 
changes that occurred in 2013 and 2014; or the other disputes against the Czech Republic and 
Italy.98 
However, in what might become a trend, a second Award was rendered in July 2016.99 In this 
case, the Tribunal likewise dismissed the claimant’s claims in their entirety. What is even 
more interesting is that this case included later legislative changes to the PV solar sector in 
Spain (i.e. those occurring in 2013 and 2014). These later changes were so severe as to make 
the investor’s investments completely unprofitable; and yet the Tribunal determined that these 
changes did not violate the relevant provisions in the ECT. More and more of these cases will 
be decided in the next year – and at least in terms of the Spanish context, it is now 
increasingly likely that many of these claims will fail. From a policy perspective, it may be 
that these arbitrations acted as a wakeup call for many Member State regulators, but that in 
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96 See supra n 52-55. 
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the end, these states (at least Spain) may emerge relatively unscathed. Only the future will be 
able to tell whether the lessons learned from this ordeal assist in shaping better regulatory 
regimes for the promotion of renewable energy going forward. 
In addition to the Spanish cases, there are seven cases that were filed against the Czech 
Republic in 2013. All cases are being brought by claimants from Western Europe and all are 
UNCITRAL arbitrations.100 These cases are likely to be based on claims of indirect 
expropriation and violations of the FET standard as they probably relate to tax adopted in 
2012 that only applies to PV solar projects installed in 2009 and 2010.101  
One case was filed against Italy in late 2013, four cases in 2015 and two cases in 2016. Six of 
the cases are ICSID arbitrations102 and one is a SCC arbitration.103 The claims in this case are 
also likely to be based on indirect expropriation and the FET standard. The timing of the 2013 
case indicates that the challenged measure may be the cap on annual spending added under 
the fifth conto energia or administrative changes that rendered a particular PV solar project 
unprofitable.104 However, more recent legislative changes introduced by the Italian parliament 
in June 2014 may give rise to a larger number of new investment treaty claims because it 
reduces the price guarantees given to PV solar producers and could be viewed as a violation 
of the legitimate expectations of PV solar investors under the ECT.105  
One other major question that arises in these cases is whether and how the investment 
tribunals will take into account states’ duties under GATT,106 the SCM Agreement107 and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to discipline the use of subsidies. 
The respondent states are likely to argue that the contested measures are justified as means of 
implementing their obligations under these treaties. If such arguments turn out to be 
unsuccessful, states may be mandated by investment tribunals to compensate investors in 
direct violation of their duties to control trade distorting subsidies.108 Moreover, funds that 
could otherwise have been available as lawful subsidies to assist establishment of new 
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production of renewable energy could be channeled towards securing an excessively high 
return on existing production facilities as a result of such decisions. In line with this type of 
reasoning, the Commission has sought leave to intervene in the PV solar cases against the 
Czech Republic claiming, inter alia, that the state aid offered to investors in the Czech 
Republic to support their PV solar projects was never notified to the Commission and 
therefore never constituted permissible state aid according to EU law.109 The Commission is 
implying that any award against the Czech Republic in these cases would itself be illegal state 
aid and therefore unenforceable.110  
While the outcome of these cases will be closely monitored by those who have invested in 
renewable energy technologies under various support schemes throughout the world, these 
cases also have a special importance in the European context. All of the cases brought to date 
are intra-EU disputes. In previous intra-EU investment treaty disputes, the Commission has 
stated that investment tribunals do not have jurisdiction over cases between EU Member 
States because only the EU has competence to rule on issues of EU law.111 However, the 
Tribunal in Charanne found that there is no legal obstacle preventing European investors 
from bringing ECT claims against EU Member States.112 The PV solar cases are likely to 
intensify the exchange between the Commission and investment treaty tribunals constituted 
under the ECT or intra-EU BITs.113 It is likely that the cases will contribute to a major shift in 
policy and practice of the EU and its Member States in regards to investment treaty 
arbitration. It is also likely that the CJEU will become involved.114 The strength and 
dedication with which investors have pursued their rights in investment tribunals, as well as 
the numerous cases before domestic courts, illustrate the importance of the interests involved. 
Such cases are resource demanding, and investors are likely to use such avenues only as a 
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measure of last resort. However, it remains to be seen whether investors will follow through 
or abandon the cases before they are resolved. 
5.  The ‘Europeanization’ of Renewable Policy – Remedies to Address Market 
Distortions 
The last decade has witnessed increasing tensions between the European internal market in 
electricity and national support schemes. In fact, most preferential national treatment schemes 
at the Member State level are likely to be in contradiction with the economic freedoms at the 
heart of the internal Energy market.115 These tensions relate specifically: (1) to the level of 
control that the EU can exert on its Member States in regard to the design of their national 
support schemes for the promotion of renewable energy, and (2) to the functioning of the 
single energy market when support schemes for the promotion of renewable energy are 
designed, implemented, and largely restricted to energy produced within a specific Member 
State. To overcome some of the problems of cross-border ‘leakage’ and of market distortions 
arising from uncoordinated support schemes among Member States, the ‘guidance’ offered by 
the Commission would entail an increasing ‘Europeanization’ of renewable energy promotion 
policies.  
The 2009 Directive did not include a harmonized support mechanism but rather opted for the 
facilitation of cross-border support of energy (statistical transfer between member states, joint 
projects and support schemes).116 However, this type of cooperation has been under-utilized 
to date. Member States seem to have relied on their national renewable sources and their 
capacity to reach their national targets on their own rather than resorting to these joint 
mechanisms as provided by the 2009 Directive.117 One main reason is likely their interest in 
developing domestic production capacity in renewable energy sectors. A major exception to 
this national focus has been the cooperation between Norway and Sweden establishing a joint 
system of green certificates in 2012.118 Under this joint system, producers situated in both 
states can be granted green certificates, electricity suppliers in both states are required to buy 
a certain quota of energy from renewable energy and can do so in either state.119 The aim is 
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for renewable energy investments to be made in optimal locations regardless of national 
borders.    
While the example of cross-border coordination of support schemes highlights the possibility 
for the implementation of specific policies that reduce problems of ‘leakage’, they may not be 
very helpful in determining how a harmonized EU-wide policy on the design of support 
schemes might work. Much of the problem relating to the ‘Europeanization’ of support 
schemes is embedded in the EU’s wider policy on permissible state aid. To specifically 
address problems highlighted in our case studies, the Commission is modifying (restricting) 
its approach to state aid in relation to renewable energy support schemes. In its most recent 
2014 Guidelines,120 the Commission has broadened the scope of the guidelines to specifically 
deal with support for renewable energy projects. At the same time, the new guidelines seek to 
move state aid rules in line with the liberalization of the electricity market and seek ‘more 
market oriented approaches that reflect the evolving cost structure of energy technologies and 
increasing cost competitiveness in the internal market’.121 In accordance with these 
guidelines, state aid in the support of renewable energy generation – from 2017 onwards – 
will be permissible when granted in a competitive bidding process as a premium increasing 
cost effectiveness, limiting distortions of competition and exposing renewables to market 
signals, except for certain installations with a smaller installed electricity capacity.122 Such a 
change in permissible state aid is a dramatic turn from the type of state aid that has been 
permissible to date. Some Member States have already started reforming their support 
schemes in line with the 2014 Guidelines.123 
Concerned that the 2014 Guidelines will reduce the ability of Member States to support the 
development of their renewable energy plans, the European Renewable Energies Federation 
(EREF) initiated annulment proceedings against the chapter on operating aid for renewable 
energy sources of the 2014 Guidelines.124 In support of its action, EREF claimed that: (1) the 
Commission lacked competence to adopt the guidelines citing Article 194 of the TFEU and 
claiming that technology-neutral renewable energy support schemes cannot be imposed on the 
Member States as they impact their sovereign energy rights;125 (2) the Commission did not 
provide sufficient justifications for the adoption of a policy requiring all Member States to 
adopt a technology-neutral competitive binding system to support renewable energy; (3) the 
Commission infringed the principle of proportionality as the instruments proposed in the 
guidelines are not suitable for the objectives of promoting renewables in the EU while 
reducing distortive effects; and (4) the Commission misused its power in trying to legislate on 
the harmonization of renewable energy support schemes, an area where even the EU legislator 
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is not competent. The CJEU held on 23 November 2015 that the claim was inadmissible on 
the ground that the applicant was not directly affected by the contested guideline.126 
Confronted with conflicting objectives (national support schemes and the protection of free 
movement), the CJEU, a central institution for the interpretation of EU Law, was required to 
clarify  the scope of national support schemes for the promotion of renewable energy. One 
question raised in its existing case law is whether national support schemes can discriminate 
against producers from other Member States and whether this can result in an unjustifiable 
barrier to trade.  
More recently, in the Ålands Vindkraft case, the CJEU was required to assess the denial by the 
Swedish Energy Agency to award green certificates to the Finish company, Ålands Vindkraft, 
operating a wind farm located on the Åland archipelago in Finland. The CJEU indicated that 
the Swedish certificates system was adopted in an effort to achieve the national renewable 
energy targets, as provided by in the 2009 Directive. In accordance with its earlier case law, 
the CJEU found that the 2009 Directive grants Member States the right to decide ‘to which 
extent they support energy from renewable sources which is produced in a different Member 
State’.127 The green certificate scheme is therefore not intended to be extended to producers 
on the territory of another Member State.128 The CJEU concluded that the measure constituted 
a measure similar to a quantitative restriction (Art. 34, TFEU), but ruled that the Swedish 
system was justified on the ground of the protection of the environment by promoting 
renewable energy (public interest ground as listed in Art. 36 TFEU).129  
The CJEU assessed the Swedish certification scheme in light of the proportionality 
principle130 and explained the three main reasons for the justifications of the territorial 
limitation in the Swedish support scheme. First, the CJEU adopted the view ‘that national 
support schemes are designed to favor energy at the production stage rather than at the 
consumption stage as environmental objectives can mainly be achieved at the production 
stage’.131 Second, Member States should be able ‘to control the effect and costs of their 
national support schemes according to their different potentials, while maintaining investor 
confidence’.132 The CJEU emphasized that ‘EU law has not harmonized the national support 
schemes for green electricity’ and therefore Member States should in principle be entitled to 
include territorial limitations in their national schemes.133 Third, the Swedish territorial 
limitation is still necessary even though Sweden has already reached its target, as it can 
support investment in new installations, give producers certain guarantees about the future of 
green electricity and thereby protect investor confidence.  
Ultimately, the CJEU ruled that Member States do not need to open their renewable energy 
support schemes to energy producers in other Member States. The reasoning of the CJEU in 
this case focused on the efficiency of the actual national support schemes system and its 
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territorial restrictions to secure investor confidence and thereby promote the renewable energy 
produced by each Member State. It seems however that the CJEU failed to address in its 
proportionality assessment why territorial restrictions in national support schemes are 
necessary to achieve the objective of environmental protection.  
Similar conclusions were reached in subsequent case law that relates to the 2001 Directive. In 
the Essent Belgium case,134 the CJEU confirmed that the national support schemes were not 
intended to cover green electricity produced in another Member State.135 The CJEU 
highlighted the role of national support schemes in assisting Member States in achieving their 
national renewable energy targets and that in doing so they are not required to ‘recognise the 
purchase of a guarantee of origin from other Member States or the corresponding purchase of 
electricity as a contribution to the fulfilment of a national quota obligation’.136 The CJEU 
referred to the reasoning in the Ålands Vindkraft case.137 In Ålands Vindkraft and Essent 
Belgium, the CJEU dismissed the Opinion of the AG Bot who concluded in both cases that the 
existing EU renewables scheme is contrary to the EU free movement rules and therefore 
cannot be justified.138   
Finally, in a similar case, and ruling on the same basis as the previously mentioned cases, the 
CJEU held, in Green Network, that Italian authorities were not entitled to enact national 
legislation allowing for the extension of the use of guarantees of origin to green electricity 
coming from a third state (in this particular case, Switzerland). National support schemes 
must in principle lead to an increase in the national production of green electricity.139  
In light of the above, it is apparent that – according to its current design and implementation – 
renewable energy policies and national support schemes are decidedly Member State focused; 
and that the policies embedded in the 2001 and 2009 Directives will allow Member States to 
design support schemes in favor of domestic production of renewable energy. In all three 
rulings briefly described, the CJEU gave great deference to the role of EU Parliament  (as 
reflected in the 2001 and 2009 Directives) by confirming that only the EU Parliament is 
empowered to decide on the opening of national support schemes to other Member States.140 
Given these recent decisions, and in light of Member State concerns about the proposed 
reduction in permissible state aid for the support of renewable energy, the Commission’s goal 
of a ‘Europeanization’ of renewable energy support schemes could meet significant resistance 
among Member States.141 The potential risks and the political sensitivities of further 
integrating support schemes on a EU-wide level were highlighted by many respondents to the 
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Commission’s public consultation as it ‘could imply citizens in one Member State having to 
contribute to renewables’ development in another Member State’.142 Some Member States 
have expressed the need for cross-border participation in support schemes to only be done on 
a voluntary basis. 
6. Conclusions – Towards an EU-wide Policy on the Promotion of Renewable 
Energy? 
As we have seen, the ambition of the Commission to regulate and coordinate Member State 
policies to promote production and consumption of renewable energy, combined with its aim 
to increase the flexibility of Member States in setting their targets, faces essential legal 
hurdles, both within the EU and under IIAs. As announced by the Commission, the reforms 
cannot be carried out without significant reforms of the current regulatory framework.143 This 
article has shown that such a reform is likely to shift the ‘policy space’ of Member States 
from the current flexibility to design support schemes to a flexibility in setting national 
targets. We have seen that many Member States are in the process of scaling back their 
support schemes to the PV solar sector. However, the situation of this sector is a special case 
and should not necessarily define the policy space needed within other renewables sectors.  
The reforms that Member States have undertaken so far demonstrate the problems of scaling 
back support schemes that investors have relied on for their long term investments. While the 
Commission is likely to face many of the same challenges, it is the Member States and not the 
Commission that will be sued by foreign investors under existing IIAs due to the fact that 
Member States will have to amend their support schemes. Initiatives by the Commission to 
prevent Member States from paying compensation mandated by investment tribunals, such as 
in the Micula case,144 is likely to further limit the policy space for Member States when 
scaling back their support schemes, and may lead to significant resistance among Member 
States against the Commission’s proposals for policy reforms.   
The case studies have shown the important effects support schemes can have in generating 
investment, and the detrimental effects that scaling back of support schemes can have for the 
establishment of new production capacity. Against this background, we may ask whether the 
Commission proposals are likely to increase production and consumption of renewable 
energy. On the basis of the case studies, it can be argued that the current policy space may 
lead to long term ineffectiveness of support schemes. Stricter state aid rules and rules 
regarding free movement of products would most likely have prevented Member States from 
designing such support schemes. However, whether such rules will promote long term 
effectiveness of support schemes remains unclear. The ‘carrot’ that the Commission proposals 
include for Member States – the flexibility in setting and achieving national targets – is not 
likely to enhance the effectiveness of national policy measures in promoting renewable 
energy. 
All the above factors point in the direction of increased reliance on the EU as responsible for 
designing and implementing measures to promote renewable energy. Yet, such transfer of 
competence would further restrict the policy space of Member States. The recent public 
consultation on a post 2020 renewables directive highlights that this restricted policy space 
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may be a cost required for the improved effectiveness of support schemes. A large number of 
respondents stated that support schemes should ‘encourage greater market responsiveness, 
resulting in gradually decreasing support levels as technologies become mature’;145 and that 
harmonized rules for support schemes at the EU level will be key in providing more certainty 
to investors and will be the most cost-effective means of achieving the 2030 target. 
Regardless of how much future competence is vested at the EU level in relation to support 
schemes, it is fairly clear that we will continue to see significant shifts in the way that support 
schemes for renewable energy are designed as the EU and its Member States try to get the 
balance right. 
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